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GETTING THE POLITICAL
ARCHITECTURE RIGHTO
By RICHARD

CULLEN* AND PETER HANKS**

As Australia approaches the twenty-first century, it finds itself, like a number
of other Anglo-centred countries in the western world, including Canada, in
the grip of continuing economic trauma. There has been a marked relative
(and absolute) slip in general economic performance. This paper focuses on
the linkages between this phenomenon and Australia's basic political
architecture. It argues that, although renovation of Australian federalism is no
panacea for these problems, there are linkages between Australia's aged,
formal, political structure and its recent economic performance. Lack of
attention to the task of serious, systematic renovation is allowing the present
outdated political structure to aggravate economic and social problems. The
article concludes that a much more adventurous, long-term approach to the
renovation of Australia's political architecture is needed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Approach of This Paper
Some fundamental questions overshadow the discussion in this
paper. What is Australia's national vision for the twenty-first century?
What sort of values do we, as a community, want Australia to embody in
2050? We, in Australia, have never been very good at articulating
responses to questions such as these. The relative comfort of our
existence and the comparative absence of national traumas must, in part,
explain this.
In this paper, we are not drafting a national vision. That is a long
task in which many must participate. But we do argue that our existing
political architecture has exceeded its "use-by" date. Our contention is
based on the accumulated Australian political experience, which
suggests that fundamental structural changes are needed in Australia.
We are concerned with the process of achieving structural change.
Frankly, that process is not working happily.
In a more perfect world we might fashion our national vision
over considerable time and then tackle structural change fully informed
by that carefully developed understanding. But we live in a highly
dynamic world, which is changing more swiftly than at any time in the
last forty years. For Australia this is a disturbing and at times, traumatic
period in its history. As a nation, Australia has to respond with greater
energy than ever before to its latest challenges. And this means tackling
issues on many fronts at the same time. In particular, we argue that this
means beginning the long task of creatively renovating our political

1 First, let us make clear what we mean by the term political architecture. This we define as

the full spectrum of the formal political structure straddling virtually all economic, social, and
political activity in Australia. Its principal component is the Australian Constitution. The
Commonwealth of Australia ConstitutionAct 1900 63 & 64 Victoria, c. 12 (U.K.)-the covering
Act-was the Act of the Parliament at Westminster, which took effect from 1901 and established
Australia as a federal nation-state. The Australian Constitution, all 128 sections of it, comprises
section 9 of the covering Act just referred to. All future references to the Australian Constitution
refer to the document that forms section 9 of the covering Act. Political architecture also includes:

the state constitutions, all the conventions of use and practice associated with constitutions at both
levels, the substrata of local government, and all the quasi-governmental offshoots at all three levels
of government.
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architecture.
Although we argue that fundamental structural changes are
needed in Australia, we recognize both the potential for change within
the existing architecture and the reality that it is here that most change
will occur in the short term. Although the achievements of ad hoc
adjustment within the existing structure cannot be dismissed, they are
essentially reactive adjustments, which largely serve to legitimate the
current order. They do not take place within an overall philosophy for
changing Australia's political architecture. They are responses, which
are very often disembodied from other structural adjustments and most
often effected as a response to one or more of the endless crises in the
Australian political economy. The new Australian system of uniform
companies and securities regulation2 is a product of this familiar
modification process.
In looking at the need for creative, fundamental change and the
growth in ad hoc reactive structural change, we stress that we are not
suggesting that some sort of magic remedy lies here for the lurching
Australian economy of the last decade. What we are saying is that, in
the search for remedies, Australia is currently paying scant attention to
the linkages between the nation's flawed political architecture and its
socio-economic performance.
We have taken a two-tiered approach to our topic. The first tier
adopts a pragmatic analysis, in keeping with the current, confined
tradition of political structure review in Australia. This is an analysis,
which largely confines itself to discussing what is possible within the
Australian political experience. The second tier of analysis places the
Australian political reality in a wider global context. It suggests that
recent attempts to engender wider debate about political structure
reform, although useful and welcome, are fairly modest when one
considers the political structure revolution, both theoretical and
practical, occurring beyond Australia and, particularly, in Europe. This
tier of analysis says that this "new constitutionalism" should be the
direction for the longer term in Australia.
This paper focuses on the federal constitutional component of
Australia's political architecture. There is discussion of the wider
political system but this is largely confined to aspects that contextualize
the constitutional issues. Limits of time and space preclude any deep
discussion, for example, of the beginnings of major changes in the party
political system in Australia.

2 See section III.A.1, below at page 18.
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B. A BriefExploration ofAustralia sPoliticalArchitecture
Australia, the nation, the federal entity, was the product,
constitutionally, of a series of conventions conducted over the last two
decades of the nineteenth century by the then semi-independent (of
Britain) colonies, which now comprise the Australian states. New
Zealand also participated in parts of the process but declined to join the
resulting federation.
Australia became a federal nation on 1 January 1901. The
document that set down this arrangement, the Australian Constitution,
was a product of those conventions. It was also a product of nineteenthcentury minds, many of them able, doing their best within time and
resource constraints, to mould an effective political structure for the
new, though still colonial, nation. There is little doubt that, for many of
the framers of the Constitution, the new structure was to be state driven.
That is, the former colonies, now states, saw themselves as the masters in
the new order and saw the new Commonwealth government as their,
albeit lusty, servant.
This intention is captured in the formal structure of the
Constitution, which, as we shall see, has changed very little since 1901.
That document gives the Commonwealth very few exclusive powers.
The principal powers conferred on it by section 51 of the Constitution
are to be shared with the states. The states, meanwhile, have their own
constitutions, with plenary powers to legislate for "all matters [related to
the state] whatsoever,' '3 explicitly preserved in sections 106 and 107 of
the Australian Constitution. Section 109, however, does make it clear
that, in the event of overlapping state and federal laws, federal laws are
to prevail.
The political reality today is quite the reverse of this formal
intention. The Commonwealth now has an effective stranglehold on tax
revenues. It manages Australia's tertiary education system. It has the
principal role in trying to manage Australia's chaotic interstate road
transport system and has now taken over substantive control of
corporate and securities regulation throughout the country. In
comparison, the Canadian provinces today enjoy far greater fiscal and
political independence than the Australian states. The provinces retain
much greater control over their educational systems, while regulation of

3 See, for example, ConstitutionAct 1902 (N.S.W.), s. 5; ConstitutionAct 1975 (Vic.), s. 16.
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the corporate sector and of road transport is also largely provincial.4
A second comparison arises from the manner in which
governments within the two countries share control of offshore
petroleum resources. In both countries, the highest courts initially said
that the central governments enjoyed virtually complete control of these
resources. In Australia, the Commonwealth, after returning the
economically insignificant territorial seas to the states, retained all
ultimate management rights and has taken over 95 per cent of all direct
government revenue from offshore oil. In Canada, the federal
government recently struck a series of accords with coastal provinces
which leaves ultimate management of the offshore at the provincial level
and gives those provinces access to 100 per cent of all direct offshore
revenues. Other examples could be cited but space is limited. Those
given illustrate that the Australian states are relatively hollow political
entities. 5
It is clear from the above brief overview that there has been a
major shift in the alignment of power between the Commonwealth and
the states since 1901. It is equally clear, however, that the document that
set out the original power alignment, the Constitution, has barely altered
in form since 1901. There are three key components to the explanation
of this remarkable detachment of constitutional substance from form:
the High Court of Australia, intergovernmental cooperation, and the
Commonwealth's spending power.
During the first twenty years of federation, the High Court
showed a marked, though by no means complete, deference to the
interests of the states. This changed in 1920, in Amalgamated Society of
Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. 6 In this case, the Court deliberately
overturned the state-deference doctrines of earlier years. It adopted a
constitutional-interpretive model, which clearly favoured the growth of
central power. Generally, from that time, the Court has proceeded with
its project of interpreting the Constitution in a manner highly favourable
to the Commonwealth. There have been some retreats from this
approach. These have been most noticeable when the Court has been
adjudicating on the usually controversial, constitutional adventures of

4 Here "regulation" refers to deciding what the rules will be, rather than simply acting as an
administrative arm of the central government.
5 That is, relative to their former selves or to regional governments in most comparable
classical federal jurisdictions.
6 (1920), 28 C.L.R. 129 [hereinafter Engineers].
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federal Labor governments.7 But they have been the exception rather
than the rule. Over the years the Court has, for example, significantly
enhanced the Commonwealth taxation powers, its corporations power,
to a lesser extent, its trade and commerce power, and, probably most
notoriously, its external affairs power.8 Currently, the Court appears to
be working some similar alchemy with the federal industrial relations
power. The only surprising aspect of this last development is that it has
taken the Court so long to do so.
A collateral aspect of the High Court's reshaping of the
Constitution has been its approach to the interpretation of section 109,
the federal supremacy provision in the Constitution. The cases are far
from consistent but the pattern of a very wide reading of the section's
ambit so as to give federal laws the maximum possible coverage is well
established Additionally, the court has crafted a doctrine that routinely
exposes many state activities to Commonwealth regulation, but confers
almost total immunity on the Commonwealth from state regulation. 10
Intergovernmental cooperation also has been important.
Comprehensive commodity-marketing schemes have been put together
by cooperating governments where neither level could, constitutionally,
have enacted such a scheme alone. Australia's current uniform
corporate and securities regulatory regime is a product of
intergovernmental cooperation. Other less spectacular instances
abound.
Finally, there is the Commonwealth spending power. The
remarkable scope of this power flows from the Commonwealth's
extraordinary dominance of government revenue raising, which is based
on two crucial factors. First, since the last war, the states have lacked the

7 For example, attempts by the 1940s federal Labor governments to control or nationalize the
state-owned and private banks were thwarted by the High Court in Melbourne Corporation v.
Commonwealth (1947), 74 C.L.R. 31 [hereinafter State Banking] and Bank of New South Wales v.

Commonwealth (1948), 76 C.L.R. 1 [hereinafterBankNationalization].
8 The latter expansion, in particular, has allowed the Commonwealth to regulate
environmentally-sensitive resource developments within the states. For remarkable examples of the
High Court's expansion of this power see, interalia: Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983), 158 C.L.L

1 [hereinafter TasmanianDam] and Richardson v. Forestry Commission (1988), 164 C.L.R. 261
[hereinafterRichardson]. Also see section IIIA.2. below at page 19.
9 P. Hanks, ConstitutionalLaw in Australia (Sydney- Butterworths, 1991) at 210-31. This is in

marked contrast to Canada where the Supreme Court has read down the implicit federal supremacy
rule so as to maximize the coverage and effectiveness of provincial law. See P.W. Hogg,
ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 417-18.
10 See further, Hanks, supra note 9 at 186-210; C. Howard, AustralianFederal Constitutional
Law, 3d ed. (Sydney. Law Book Company, 1985) at 143-229.
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political (though not the constitutional) capacity to raise income tax,
thus leaving this revenue-raising zone entirely to the Commonwealth. 11
Second, in a series of cases, the High Court has prohibited the states
from levying any sales taxes.1 2 All of this has resulted in overflowing
Commonwealth coffers. The states get a large block of their federal
funds without strings attached but the Commonwealth has, over the
years, made a regular practice of "giving" some funds with many strings
attached. The High Court has repeatedly sanctioned this practice.13
The Commonwealth has come to dominate tertiary education
throughout the country principally through the use of its spending
power. The power has also been used in many other areas of public
policy normally outside of the Commonwealth's legislative domain, such
as urban planning, housing, health care, and so on.
The current structure is working, after a fashion, because it has
been bent almost double. This is the political reality of Australian
federalism in 1991. The processes described show no signs of abating.
Indeed, they appear to be accelerating. The exigencies of global
economic life in the 1980s found the majority of Australian states in
varying degrees of serious financial trouble. Victoria, Western
Australia, and South Australia have been consumed by probably their
worst economic crises this century. All of this has produced an increase
in the scope and pace of intergovernmental cooperation, further eroding
the remaining disparateness of Australian federalism.
C. Some Comments of the ContemporaryAustralianEconomy
Various measures of Australia's declining economic
performance may be consulted. They vary somewhat in detail but they
all conclude that, especially over the last two decades, economic decline
has been rapid and dramatic. Within the "first" world, Australia has

11 The Commonwealth achieved this result by passing a package of acts, which applied
irresistible economic pressures on the states to hand over their income-taxing powers towards the

beginning of the Second World War. The High Court endorsed the constitutional legitimacy of this
legislative scheme in South Australiav. Commonwealth (1942), 65 C.L.R. 373 [hereinafter First
Uniform Tax]. See further, R. Cullen, Federalism in Action: The Australian and CanadianOffshore

Disputes (Sydney: Federation Press, 1990) at 37; Hanks, supranote 9 at 265-70.
12 Cullen, Ibid. at 38; Hanks, supranote 9 at 241-62. There are some curious exceptions to this
rule.
13 See, for example, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v. W. V Moran Ply. Ltd., (1940) 63
C.L.R. 338 [hereinafter Moran] and First Uniform Tax, supra note 11 for possibly the two most

notorious incidents.
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slipped from first,14in terms of standard of living, in 1900 to sixteenth or
eighteenth today.
The battery of measures of socio-economic performance in The
Economist's The World in 199115 all reinforce this impression of the
Australian economy. The current account deficit is one of the worst in
the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD);
unemployment figures are soaring and growth prospects deriving from
internal forces are bleak. A linchpin of the domestic economy, the
building industry, was recently described by the Royal Commissioner
enquiring into the industry in the State of New South Wales as
"massively worse" than construction sectors overseas and as "hopelessly
inefficient." 16
The Director of the federal government's influential Economic
Planning and Advisory Committee (EPAC) recently warned that Australia
may be condemned to a recurring cycle of trade crises and declining
living standards. 17 Another suggestion made recently is that perhaps the
only way for Australia to achieve a current account surplus is to obtain a
major reduction in imports. It is bleakly suggested that this might be
achieved by putting the nation into permanent semi-recession. 18
In the early 1980s, the Washington-based Brookings Institution
completed a comprehensive review of many aspects of the Australian
economy. The results of that research were published in 1984.19 In their
14 S. Moeller, "Ignorance Not Bliss in Asian Trade Relations" The Australian (23 February
1991) 51. In this article, Professor Helen Hughes of the School of Pacific Studies of the Australian

National University is quoted as saying that Australia's relative rankings were first in 1900, third in
1935, and fifteenth or sixteenth today. See also T. Colebatch, "Australian Wages Lower Than Most,
Say OECD Figures" Melbourne Age (10 May 1991) 5. Australia is now paying real wages in the
OECD, higher only than those in Greece, Portugal, and New Zealand. This places it eighteenth out
of twenty-one OECD-reporting nations. Australian wages are less on average than $20,000 (U.S.)per
annum. In the United Kingdom, the average wage is $25,000 (U.S.), while in Switzerland it is
$46,000 (U.S.) perannum. Ireland, Spain, and Italy also pay higher average wages than Australia.

15 (London: The Economist Publications, 1990).
16

T. Chappell & M. Whittaker, "Commissioner Attacks Building Industry" The Australian (16
March 1991) 3. The Commissioner went on to point out that the lost time through bad weather and
industrial disputation was 30 per cent. The comparable figure from countries with radically less
favourable climates was 10 per cent.
17

R. Spiers, "EPAC: 'Business Way Out of Touch' Australian FinancialReview (4 February

1991) 1.
18

T. Colebatch, "Following Trends Brings Growth" Melbourne Age (22 March 1991) 6. There

is some resonance with this prospect and the manner in which the United Kingdom economy
stagnated for most of the twenty-year period between world wars.
19 R.E. Caves & L.B. Krause, eds., The Australian Economy: A View from the North

(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1984).
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introduction, the editors concluded that Australia was clearly in for

more pain. There was no way to prepare for this in the short term but
much could be done to prepare for the future.

In particular, the

exposure of Australian business to world competition and the
preparation of its young people by large investments in human capital
were recommended. The editors concluded that Australia was doing
neither. 20 Since 1984 some headway has been made but the
recommendations, particularly the latter, are far from being met.21
It is not fanciful to suggest that the Australia of the twenty-first
century will become a major Asian farm, quarry, holiday spot, sometime
property investment zone, and possible refuse disposal point. 22
II. AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A central thesis of this paper is that, as Australia confronts the
twenty-first century, the deficiencies in its troublesome political structure
advertise themselves ever more blatantly. The accelerating growth in ad
hoc intergovernmental adjustment is welcome but seriously incomplete
as a response. It is welcome because some progress has been made in
areas such as companies and securities regulation, industrial relations,
It is also welcome because these
and even environmental protection
acrimonious, and more swift
less
responses are more carefully crafted,
than adjustments achieved through High Court litigation. 24 Moreover, it
20

1bid at 23.

21 The revolution in tertiary education underway in Australia over the last four to five years
has largely concentrated on squeezing a far higher number of graduates through the existing system
with minimized allocation of new resources. Another characteristic has been the forced creation of
massive, amalgamated tertiary institutions. The system, more than ever, harbours serious
discontent and is under great strain. Education is still grudgingly regarded as necessary by
widespread sections of the community and within the corridors of power. But government attitude
towards funding remains parsimonious.
22 This forecast implies that Asian nations will, ultimately, be able to determine Australia's
role by a process of gradually taking control of production and management mechanisms
throughout the economy. This is not meant as anti-Asian rhetoric. Indeed, if Australia's socioeconomic slide continues into the next century without significant abatement, it likely will be better
for greater competence to be introduced in this way.
23 See section III.A, below at 17.
24

This is still an important mode of structural adjustment in Australia (see section I.B, above
at page 8). But intergovernmental agreements on change is the area of growing importance. There
appears to be a growing recognition, especially within the various state governments, of the
seriousness of Australia's economic prognosis. A concomitant improved understanding of the costs
of the frequent failure to make decisive, united responses to national problems is also developing.
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places the structural decision-making process in the hands of
democratically elected persons rather than non-elected judges. 25
Intergovernmental adjustments are incomplete because: (1) they
are reactive; (2) they are unrelated to similar developments; (3) they do
not occur within any developed framework for structural change; and (4)
they are often mistaken for or touted as major structural reforms.
Moreover, intergovernmental adjustments fail to establish any serious
interdisciplinary programme for a creative overhaul of the nation's
political architecture. Such change must evolve as an ongoing process.
That is, we should not attempt to get the political architecture right once
and for all, or even for the next fifty to one hundred years. We need to
establish a practice of continuous review of our fundamental structure
with a view to enhancing its real responsiveness.
The challenge in addressing the above shortcomings is to
develop a climate receptive to serious discussion of fundamental
restructuring. It is over one hundred years since we last enjoyed such a
national mood in Australia. It achieved a great deal-the implementation of Australia's current classical federal system. 26
How does one engender a repeat of that sea change in political
discussion? There is no simple way. Any such process will begin and
operate slowly. A century ago, political discussion was driven principally
by compelling economic and defence considerations. Today's economic
considerations are, if anything, even more compelling. Although longterm planning is necessary, we would argue that the more immediate
process of substantial ad hoc adjustment of the political architecture
must continue. This is providing some effective abatement. But we
need a framework so that the relationship between such adjustments can
be recognized and studied. And we need to tackle the larger task of
rejuvenating the fundamental structure itself. So far there appears to
have been no serious attempt to develop a framework for screening and
delivering ad hoc adjustments. And, attempts at fundamental rethinking
25 Intergovernmental arrangements are often also criticized for failing to meet a basic
requirement of liberal-democratic theory: the need for accountability. The argument is that when
the two sovereign levels of government in a federation merge their powers to provide a combined
response to a problem, it is no longer possible-for the voting public, especially-to pinpoint
responsibility. This is a valid criticism. In relative terms, however, the point made in the text still
holds. Intrinsically the High Court's remodelling of the Constitution is almost totally removed from
any democratic accountability.
26 By classical federalism we mean a political structure in which two sovereign levels of
government (central and regional) are designated as separate powers; neither level can unilaterally
extinguish the other; both levels answer directly to the people; the regional governments occupy
separate geographic areas and coexist with a third level of micro-government; and the whole
package is embodied in a rigid, formally all-encompassing written constitution.
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rarely move beyond the intense diagnosis of some symptoms of disorder
in the current system.
It is a truism that processes of constitutional change are slow.
Too often that recognition is both introduction and conclusion in
Australia. We do not try to probe beyond it to understand this process
of slow change. Moreover, the very slowness tends to lend a kind of
sanctified, unique status to constitutional study. All of this tends to
quarantine constitutional study within certain limits.
An alternative approach views constitutional change as one of a
range of slowly altering processes in society; it is an example within a
genre and not unique. Some social scientists with a particular interest in
regional development expressly categorize constitutional change in much
this way.
For some time regional scientists 27 have attempted to bring a
multi-disciplinary approach to understanding spatial structures. This
involves an analysis of the working of an economy in a spatial context.
Regional science attempts to account for uneven concentrations of
population and industry, focusing on successful and emerging areas as
well as depressed peripheral economies. This approach provides scope
to broaden an essentially introspective, legalistic approach to the
development of constitutional structures.
Regional science developed from the application of conventional
neoclassical economics to help locational development problems. 28
Later it was developed to explain the changing economic fortunes of
regions. Recent work has shown that patterns of regional development
(especially, urban regional development) reflect the interaction of a set
of "change processes," some of which are slow, like developing political
structures, and some fast, like varying rates of interest and other
economic variables. Scanning European urban history, Andersson
argues that there have been four broad shifts in the logistics of
production and exchange-the "four logistical revolutions"-associated
with the expansion and decline of regions. 29 These logistical revolutions
27 The discipline of regional science is a relatively new and not uncontroversial one. It

originated in the United States in the mid-1950s. It blends skills from a number of areas including
geography, economics, and urban and regional planning.
28
29

W. Isard, Locationand Space Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1956).

A-E. Andersson, "Presidential Address: The Four Logistical Revolutions" (1986) 59 Papers
of the Regional Science Association 1. Andersson argues that the four logistical revolutions
occurred over the period 1000 AD to 2000 AD. In sequence, they are as follows:
1. The first logistical revolution emerged in Italy in the eleventh century and ended in
northern Europe in the sixteenth century. This was the period when the Crusades created demands
for expeditionary resources. This undermined the previous tribal-feudal order in Europe. The
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are not limited to technological change. They also refer to changes in
organization and production and in the political and social infrastructure
of a region. 30
Andersson and Batten argue that we are now in the midst of the
fourth logistical revolution where "knowledge-intensive production" is
rapidly displacing the third logistical revolution (better known as the
"industrial revolution"31 ) in certain western nations.32 They argue
further that a consequence of this is "the emergence of a new political
structure based on the importance of knowledge handling occupations."
Moreover, "[tjhis will precipitate a declining importance for those
political and social movements currently associated with the third
logistical revolution." 33 Batten has further shaped this idea by arguing
that changes to a nation's political fabric are needed to facilitate the
evolution of successful regions during the fourth logistical revolution. In
other words, we need to rethink our social and political structures while
recognizing that we are in the midst of an era of rapid change.34
In Batten's work a distinction is drawn between so-called "slowly
changing arenas of infrastructure" and faster processes of change.35 But
both are recognized as processes of change. In the latter, faster
category, we regularly attempt to influence the process by instruments of
monetary, fiscal, and trade policies, and so on. Australia's much
destruction of that order opened up Europe to trade. The previously never-ending fights among the
miniature countries of central Europe abated with the reduction of fighting resources.
2. The second logistical revolution emerged in Italy in the sixteenth century and ended in
northern Europe in the nineteenth century. This era was characterized by the development of
revolutionary trade transaction (credit) facilities. The private Italian bankers began this process,
which fundamentally altered trading relations. "The city of Amsterdam then made the spectacular
innovation of establishing an officially guaranteed central bank.
3. The third logistical revolution emerged in England in the eighteenth century and, it is
predicted, will conclude within the developed nations in the twenty-first century. This era is better
known as the industrial revolution.
4. The fourth logistical revolution is currently emerging in Japan, the U.S.A., Switzerland,
Western Germany, and Sweden. This era is characterized by a major shift to information and
knowledge-based production.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. at 7.
32 As noted above, these countries are Japan, the U.S.A., Sweden, Switzerland, and West
Germany. See A.E. Andersson & D.F. Batten, "Creative Nodes, Logistical Networks, and the
Future of the Metropolis" (1988) 14 Transportation 281.
33

Ibid. at 293.

34 D.F. Batten, "Shaping the Future Arenas of Melbourne" (The Kemsley Oration Address to
the Victoria Division of the Royal Australian Planning Institute, Melbourne, Australia, November
1990).
35

Ibid. at 3.
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discussed attempts at microeconomic reform largely fall into this
category. Redeveloping a nation's education system involves much
longer lead times for the implementation of change and would fall into
the former category. The quintessential slowly changing arena, however,
is constitutional or fundamental political structure alteration. The
argument is made that slowly changing arenas have a profound
controlling, indeed, at times, enslaving, influence on all faster processes
36
of change.
This perception brings constitutional change into the foreground
of social and economic development. Australia's Constitution was
forged in the midst of the industrial revolution (the third logistical
revolution) and was a material product of that economic era. The
Andersson/Batten analysis strongly suggests that, in adjusting to the new,
knowledge-based production era, nations need to develop their political
architecture to accommodate and take advantage of these fundamental
changes. We currently show precious few signs of doing so in Australia.
III. THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION
A. The AustralianExperience
Ninety years of experience suggest that Australia's federal
structure impedes effective policy development in areas central to
Australia's future role in the global economic order. Policy development
in areas such as corporate and financial regulation, resource and
environmental management, or industrial relations and communications,
will enhance or retard Australia's participation in the world economy.
To enhance that participation, policy development should be uniform,
planned yet responsive to evolving environments, and driven by a
coherent strategy. Diffuse, reactive, and self-contradictory policy
development is likely to handicap Australia as a competitor in the world
economy.
When a nation acts within the international community, lack of
strong central leadership presents a considerable disadvantage. But
centralization of policy development does not guarantee effectiveness.
Indeed, in a society with diverse economic conditions and divergent
political cultures, functional policies should be built on the participation
of a wide range of interests in order to bind interested parties to the
36 Batten, ibid., concludes by suggesting the need for a new, permanent ministry for

constitutional amendments.
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developed policy and thereby pre-empt frustrating opposition to policy
implementation.
1. Corporations Law
In the Australian context, this point emerges with stark clarity
from our recent experience in the area of corporate regulation. For ten
years prior to the 1989 passage of the Commonwealth Corporations
Act,3 7 corporate activities central to capital formation and investment
were regulated under a "co-operative scheme." The scheme featured
complementary state and federal legislation, whose terms represented
the lowest common denominator upon which the participating
governments could agree. Amending the various statutes required the
agreement of all participants: the six states, the Northern Territory, and
the Commonwealth, acting through a Ministerial Council.
Consequently, as the capital market heated up during the 1980s and
corporate entrepreneurs exploited ambiguities and inadequacies in the
regulatory regime, adjustments to that regime were slow in coming.
Local and international criticism of the inadequacies of the regime grew,
as did the risk of discouraging overseas investment in Australia.
Both the 1974 Rae Committee and the 1988 Constitutional
Commission stressed the disadvantages inherent in the lack of a national
regulatory regime for the securities and corporate sectors. The
Commission said that "the arguments against a clear and express federal
power ... are in patent disregard of the realities of business and finance

in Australia today." 38
The federal government responded by drafting a package of
legislation to place regulation of corporations on a national and uniform
footing. The centre-piece of this package was the proposed Corporations
Act. This Act would have introduced a single and comprehensive regime
for regulating the formation, internal affairs, and winding up of trading
and financial corporations. It was to be administered by a national
regulatory body, the Australian Securities Commission.
The states' reaction was particularly instructive. Several states
immediately launched a constitutional challenge in the High Court
arguing that the federal Parliament could not regulate the formation of
trading and financial corporations. As the litigation progressed, it
became clear that the states' principal interest was in protecting the
37

CorporalionsAct1989 (Cth) [hereinafter CorporationsAct].
38 Constitutional Commission, FinalReport, para 11.109.
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revenue base represented by the regulation of corporations. The states
had no plausible objections to the central regulation of corporations and
the securities market beyond their fiscal self-interest. Consequently,
when the states' technical legal argument was accepted by the High
Court and key provisions in the Corporations Act were found to be
beyond the legislative power conferred by section 51(xx) of the
Constitution, 39 the states began negotiating. Rather than seeking a
regime that would best balance the interests of the community with
those of the corporate and financial sectors, they sought the best
financial deal for themselves, in exchange for their recently confirmed
constitutional monopoly. Following two months of hard bargaining, the
Alice Springs Agreement was settled between the Commonwealth and
the states and the territories. Under this agreement, the states
undertook to adopt the Commonwealth's Corporationslaw, effectively
supplying the power found to be lacking in Incorporation.40 Meanwhile,
the Commonwealth undertook to give the states and territories a share
of the revenues generated by corporate regulation and a modest role in
the administration of the new national scheme for corporate regulation.
The national scheme came into operation on 1 January 1991.
Eventually, it might be said, the federal government achieved a
functional result with the adoption by the states of its new Corporations
Act and its associated legislation: although the campaign was long and
hard fought, the eventual achievement vindicated our federal system by
illustrating that it is still capable of achieving a positive result. But the
struggle to achieve that result and the position adopted during the
campaign by most of the states demonstrated a basic feature and
essential weakness, of our political architecture. The division of political
responsibility between the centre and the regions made at the end of the
nineteenth century requires substantial adaptation to meet the needs of
the twenty-first century. This division of power enables interest
groups-the state governments-to block legislative reform in order to
serve their own interests.
2. Resource and Environmental Policy
This essential weakness is further illustrated in the field of
resource management and environmental policies. The issues in these
fields are driven by several factors: the pressure to achieve short-term
39

New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1990), 169 C.L.R. 482 [hereinafterIncorporation].

40

Ibid.
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economic advantage through the exploitation and sale of resources
(timber, minerals, and agricultural produce); the intense regional
competition for control of short-term economic advantage; the
countervailing recognition that long-term economic advantage demands
prudent management of productive resources, including the limited
supplies of land and water; and the international pressure for resource
management policies, which will retard rather than promote
environmental degradation.
In this multifaceted and essentially contradictory context,
Australia, in common with other resource-rich countries, must develop
functional policies to balance short-term economic gain against more
prudent investment and the need to slow the destruction of the earth's
resources. The states' approach to resource development policy
demonstrates their inability to balance these factors. The competition
among regional governments for immediate gain from development
(more accurately, exploitation) projects and their lack of accountability
to the international community skew the process of policy formulation.
The federal government, too, can be distracted from a sensible
consideration of long-term resource goals by the prospect of immediate
financial advantage and by the drive to achieve a short-term competitive
edge in international markets. But its focus is necessarily broader than
that of the states. And it has the need and capacity to integrate national
policy development with the international agenda, which is essential to
the long-term interests of Australia and the maintenance of life on
Earth.
However, the formal Australian constitutional documents give
scant recognition to the need for national policy making in resource
management and environmental protection. This oversight is not
surprising. After all, the Australian Constitution reflects the concerns
and sensitivities of the closing decade of the nineteenth century. None
of the Constitution's drafters could have foreseen the extraordinary
growth in resource exploitation, industrial capacity, and domestic
consumption, which evolved in the following century. Accordingly, they
could not have anticipated the risk of resource depletion and exhaustion,
which that exploitation has posed. Nor, despite the English experience
in the nineteenth century, could they have grasped the danger to the
critical resources of air, water, and soil now posed by industrial and
consumer growth. And, while land degradation was not entirely alien to
their experience, the drafters would no doubt have regarded as alarmist
any realistic prediction of the salination damage, which development of
agriculture has imposed on Australia.
In its federal distribution of powers, the Australian Constitution
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makes no mention of resource management and environmental
protection. According to the conventional (and still dominant) view of
Australian federalism, the Constitution's silence indicated that these
topics were reserved for the states. 41 Consequently, the states had initial
responsibility to develop resource management standards and
environmental protection policies. When pressure accumulated for
national policies and standards, the Commonwealth was obliged to
resort to a series of indirect approaches.
In an economy which, for most of its modern economic history,
has functioned as a granary and quarry for the developed world, the
most obvious process for achieving national resource and environmental
goals has been the Commonwealth's control over the export trade. If
the market for Australian resources is largely outside Australia, then
prohibiting export of a commodity will almost certainly stop the local
production of that commodity. In this way, the current national Labor
government has been able to impose strict limits on uranium mining,
wood-chip production, and the construction of paper pulp mills.
The potential represented by the Commonwealth's power over
exports was demonstrated in Murphyores v. Commonwealth.42 The High
Court held that the Commonwealth could use its power of trade and
commerce with other countries 43 to prohibit the export from Australia of
minerals (zircon and rutile concentrates) whose extraction had been
approved by the State of Queensland but was assessed by the
Commonwealth as likely to damage the environment. The prohibition
on export effectively prevented the extraction of the minerals because,
without an export market, the return on capital was not adequate to
justify extracting them. In answer to the mining company's objection
that the Commonwealth was intruding into an area of state
responsibility, the High Court emphasized that the validity of the
Commonwealth controls depended on what those controls legally
prohibited-export-and not on the motives of the Commonwealth or
44
the practical or economic effect of the prohibition.
The approach adopted by the Commonwealth to the mining of
41 Each of the state parliaments is declared by its own Constitution Act to have the power to
make laws for the state "in all cases whatsoever." Section 107 of theAustralian Constitution declares
that the state parliaments continue to have the legislative powers of their colonial predecessors,
except to the extent that the new Constitution "exclusively vested" a power in the Commonwealth
or removed that power from the states.

42 (1976), 136 C.L.R. 1 [hereinafter Murphyores].
43

Australian Constitution, s. 51(i).

44

Murphyores,supra note 42 at 19-20.
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zircon and rutile on Fraser Island was based on the idea that specific and
narrow heads of constitutional power could be exercised to achieve a
wide range of broad policy objectives. In this way, the Commonwealth's
powers over international and interstate trade and commerce, 45
taxation, 46 and corporations 47 have been used as levers to implement
national resource and environmental policies. This use of relatively
narrow legislative powers to achieve objectives outside the
Commonwealth's direct control has, since the landmark decision in
8 been consistently endorsed by the High Court. 49
Engineers,4
The most dramatic expansion of the Commonwealth's
environmental control policies has been achieved through exploitation
of the external affairs power under section 51(xxix) of the Constitution.
This expansion has been aided by the increasing prominence of
environmental issues on the international agenda over the past two
decades and by the High Court's expansive reading of section 51(xxix).
In Tasmanian Dam,50 the Court held that the Commonwealth
Parliament could legislate to prevent the construction of a hydroelectric
dam by the State of Tasmania where Australia had entered into an
international agreement, 51 which required Australia to protect the site of
the dam. The external affairs power, the majority of the Court said,
empowered the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for Australia the
implementation of any international obligation that Australia had
assumed under a bonafide international treaty. This proposition was not
affected by the fact that the subject matter of the obligation might
otherwise lie outside the specific powers of the Commonwealth
Parliament.
This proposition has now been confirmed by all members of the
Court and extended to the implementation of the non-obligatory aspects
of international agreements.5 2 Thus, the Commonwealth Parliament can
legislate to "freeze" development pending an inquiry to determine
whether the development poses a threat to internationally-endorsed
45AustralianConstitution, s. 51(i).
46

1bid. at s. 51(ii).

47

Ibid. at s. 51(xx).

48

Supra note 6.

49 See, for example, Fairfax v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 C.L.R. 1;
Murphyores,supra note 42.

50 Supra note 8.
51 Conventionfor the Protectionofthe World CulturalandNaturalHeritage,(1972) UNESCO.
52 Richardson,supra note 8.
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environmental values. And, in Queensland v. Commonwealth,5 3 the
Court decided that it was for the international community to determine
whether a particular matter fell within Australia's obligations under a
multilateral treaty. The Court could not undertake to decide whether
the land in question was part of the world's natural heritage so as to
determine the extent of Australia's international obligation.
Relying on this expansive interpretation of the external affairs
power, the Commonwealth has acted to protect a wilderness area against
the construction of a hydroelectric dam; to protect native forests against
clear-felling; to impose an orderly regime on the timber industry in the
northern rain forests; and to reduce the utilization of greenhouse gases
in Australia.
This use of the external affairs power to implement national
resource and environmental policies has attracted considerable attention
But it may be that another of the
over the past decade.
Commonwealth's legislative powers, apparently unrelated to these
concerns, holds the most significant potential for supporting those
It seems that the Constitution's section 51(xx), the
policies.
corporations power, will support Commonwealth regulation of the
"external" activities of foreign corporations and trading and financial
corporations, that is, corporate activities affecting persons and things
outside the shell of the corporate actor. This point, with its wide
potential to expand Commonwealth regulatory power in an economy
5 4
dominated by corporations, was made in Tasmanian Dam.
Commonwealth legislation prohibiting a foreign or trading corporation
from interfering with land designated by the Commonwealth as having
environmental significance was held to be legislation with respect to
foreign corporations and trading corporations. Accordingly, it was
supported by section 51(xx).
In summary, the Commonwealth has been given the power to
administer national standards in several areas, which have a direct
impact on resource and environmental policies. Is this an illustration of
the flexibility of our political architecture, of its capacity to adapt to new
problems? Some observers will, no doubt, regard this concession of
national power as an endorsement of the organic character of Australia's
constitutional processes.
However, there is a further aspect to this apparent concession of
broader national responsibility for resource and environmental policy: it

53 (1989), 167 C.LR. 232.
54 Supra note 8.
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has been incomplete. While the Commonwealth is seen to have the
power to protect air quality by controlling the emission of chloro-fluorocarbons in order to meet its obligations under the Montreal Protocol, 55 it
has not acted to protect the quality of inland water against the ravages of
phosphates. The latter is seen as a state responsibility. No doubt, a
courageous national government could find a means to achieve that
control. For example, the corporations power would support the
imposition of standards on the corporate manufacturers and distributors
of detergents, and the taxation power would support selective taxes,
effectively penalizing the production and distribution of offending
products. The fundamental difficulty is that, in order to develop and
apply national standards to a national problem, the Commonwealth
must resort to a patchwork of legislative powers designed for another era
and a radically different society. Again, while the Commonwealth has
begun to express concern at the devastation of Australia's largest
resource, land, there are very real doubts that it has the power to
implement policies to reverse the destruction and degradation of the
past two *centuries.
3. Industrial Relations
In Australia's mixed economy, with its basic capitalist features,
the relations between employers and workers, between capital and
labour, are critical to economic policy and development, and occupy a
central position in the political agenda. Questions of productivity,
security of employment, industrial harmony, wage rates, and retirement
incomes are seen as interacting with inflation and employment rates, the
balance of Australia's current account, and the international value of
Australian currency. The reputations and political fortunes of
governments are closely linked to those variables.
The 1988 Constitutional Commission emphasized "the legitimate
concerns of the Commonwealth" in employment conditions and
industrial relations. These were seen to be of "enormous importance" to
the development of industry and commerce, to the strength of export
industries, and to the replacement of imports. 56
The assumption of the Australian Constitution appears to be
55 MontrealProtocolNo. 4 to amend the Conventionfor the Unification of CertainRules Relating
to InternationalCarriageby Airsigned at Warsawon 12 October1929 as amended by the Protocoldone
at the Hague on 28 September 1955 (Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organization, 1975).
56
Constitutional Commission, supra note 38 at para. 11.148.

1993]

Australia'sPoliticalArchitecture

that the national government has only an indirect, perhaps passing,
responsibility for industrial relations. Although other subsections of
section 51 might be exploited to support Commonwealth legislation
dealing with aspects of this topic, the only one directly relevant is section
51(xxxv). It gives the Commonwealth legislative power over the
prevention and settlement, through "conciliation and arbitration [,] ... of
industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State."
The powers of the Commonwealth Parliament are, therefore,
explicitly limited in several ways. They are confined to the settlement or
prevention of "disputes." Those disputes must be "industrial" and must
"extend beyond ... one State." And the method of settlement or
prevention must be "conciliation [or] arbitration." The extent of those
limits and the consequential constraints on the capacity of the national
government to integrate industrial relations policy with its broader
economic management policy are crucial to the coherence of its
economic policy.
Those limits have, at various stages over the past ninety years,
been drawn quite narrowly. Recently, many of the narrower views of
what constitutes an "industrial dispute" and of what processes are
encompassed within "conciliation and arbitration" have been eroded by
judicial exposition. However, the national government's powers in this
area remain limited by the terms of section 51(xxxv).
The major limitation in this area has been the High Court's
insistence that the terms of section 51(xxxv) confine the Commonwealth
Parliament to legislating so as to delegate to an autonomous agency the
junction of preventing or settling interstate industrial disputes through
conciliation and arbitration. This subsection neither supports an
industrial relations code nor permits the Commonwealth Parliament to
direct the agency as to the settlement it must impose on any dispute.
Acting within this limited conception of the power, the Parliament
established a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, known from 1957 as
the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. Later the Industrial
Relations Act 198857 established an Australian Industrial Relations
Commission. The Court and the commissions have been given
autonomous power to apply conciliation and arbitration to the
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the
limits of any one state. This autonomy was expressed in the following
terms by a High Court justice in 1967:

57

(Cth), ss. 8-49.
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The Commission exercises a far-reaching authority over the national economy. But the

Parliament has no power under the Constitution to direct that it go about its task of
settling industrial disputes by fixing wages according to some particular principle or
formula. It must be given a discretion as to means having regard to the end, the
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration.58

Section 51(xxxv) has also been seen as limiting the matters over
which the Commission has jurisdiction to disputes between employers
and employees about industrial issues, as distinct from political and
"management prerogative" issues, where those disputes extend beyond
one state. In large part, members of the High Court have imposed these
limits out of a poorly concealed concern to contain the expansionist
ambitions of the Commonwealth Parliament and government-a
concern which, as Murphy J. put it in 1976, "keeps the pre-Engineers
ghosts walking."59 It is only in the last few years that some members of
the Court have conceded that such a concern is inappropriate in an
industrial economy which is increasingly national. Deane J. recently
acknowledged "the close interaction and interdependence of almost all
industrial relations between employees and employers in modern
Australia" as a reason for substantially liberalizing the Court's restrictive
reading of section 51(xxxv). 60
This is not the place for a discussion of the intricacies of the
Commonwealth's legislative powers under section 51(xxxv) and the
consequential limits on the powers of the Industrial Relations
Commission. It is enough to repeat the Constitutional Commission's
employers
observation that, as a result of "scores of High Court cases ...
and employees have been required to master, and use for their own
purposes, a great deal of technical law that is otherwise irrelevant to the
social aspects of industrial relations law." 61
Prominent among the technicalities, which plague industrial
relations in Australia, is the federal division of authority between the
national Industrial Relations Commission and its state counterparts.
That division is reflected in the organization of trade unions and
employer groups, many of which have assumed a federal structure. Both
employees and employers have sought to manipulate the parallel
58 R v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parle Amalgamated
Engineering Union (1967), 118 C.L.R. 219 at 269 (Windeyer J).
59

Attomey-General (Western Australia) er rel. Anselt Transport Industries (Operations)Ply. Ltd.
v.Ausfralian NationalAirlinesCommission (1976), 138 C.L.t. 492 at 530.
60 Re FederatedStoremen andPackers Union of.Australia; expare Wooldumpers (Victoria) Ltd.
(1989), 166 C.L.R. 311 at 328.
61 Supra note 38 at para. 11.122.
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industrial relations systems to achieve what they perceive as the best
short-term result. And industrial relations policies have fallen into
conflict and confusion, as the Commonwealth and state governments
have pursued sharply diverging ideological and economic goals.
In many industries and at many industrial sites, conditions of
employment are regulated by several distinct "awards," 62 made by both
Commonwealth and state agencies. Although there has been substantial
progress over the past few years toward achieving a degree of
cooperation between Commonwealth and state agencies (largely
through cross-appointing members of the various agencies), the
structural weakness of the division of power remains. That weakness is,
quite simply, that an essential element in a national economy is afflicted
by contradictory policies and divided regulation. The significance of
industrial relations to the health of that economy demands coherent
policies, whether those policies reflect the intensive centralization and
regulation, which has characterized Australian industrial relations over
the past ninety years, or whether the policies reflect a more liberal,
enterprise-based, contractual system.
These considerations moved the 1988 Constitutional
Commission to describe the current federal distribution of industrial
relations powers as "deeply flawed, whether viewed from the aspect of
Parliamentary Government, national economic management, a rational
federal system or efficiency."' 63 The Commission proceeded to
recommend that the Commonwealth be given legislative power over
"industrial relations."
B. A ComparativeAmplification
Australia's political structure is not the only one suffering from
incontestable stress. We believe there are some significant lessons for
Australia in the developments occurring in Europe. In particular, the
recent European constitutional experience speaks strongly of the need
for Australia to question more openly, honestly, and thoroughly the
nature of Australia's current political structure.
There have been cataclysmic constitutional changes throughout
eastern Europe over the last two to three years. These, principally, have
been triggered by the collapse of state communism in the former
62 This is the term used to describe the formal decisions of industrial arbitration agencies in

Australia.
63 Supra note 38 at para. 11.155.
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U.S.S.R., its eastern European satellites, and in Yugoslavia and Albania.
In western continental Europe, however, there have been major
constitutional changes driven by forces other than the collapse of any
ideology. These changes have been introduced, generally, within a
stable, existing political order. However, not all countries in western
Europe have participated in this process.
We are more concerned with changes occurring at the national
level rather than the remarkable movement towards a transnational,
federal structure for the European Community. That development is
clearly of great importance, but at the national level the adaptation of
existing, relatively stable political structures suggests that our reverence
in Australia for the relative immutability of our constitutional structure
is an attitude from a passing era. Let us consider some examples.
Austria is not yet a member of the European Community but is
moving fairly rapidly to join. The process of constitutional change there
in some ways resembles that in Australia. That is, there has been
significant incremental change particularly since the mid-1950s when
Austria ceased to be an occupied country after the last war. The process
has not, however, relied largely on the courts. The Austrian federal
constitution, originally crafted after the collapse of the Hapsburg
Empire in 1918, allows for relatively easy formal constitutional change.
It is also clear that, in Austria, major changes in patterns of
behaviour of the principal political parties have been crucial. Between
the wars these parties were eventually drawn into civil war. The
experience of the Anchluss and the Second World War created a
modified political mentality, which stressed cooperation. The Austrian
experience has been heavily criticized for its non-parliamentary,
corporate thrust. But a great deal has been achieved. Austria is now a
thriving, prosperous country. Less than fifty years ago it was a
devastated, occupied nation. The relative adaptiveness of the country's
basic political structure has contributed to this achievement.
Recently one Austrian scholar suggested that what we need in a
modern constitutional system is a "permanent learning capacity based
on a self-referential procedure" 64 His argument begins with the
observation that constitutional legitimation in medieval Europe had a
religious base. The erosion of this form of legitimation led to a search
for a new anchor or certainty. During the process of secularization the
.notion of the rule of law evolved. The law was not just an instrument of
social management. Basic law, relatively unchanging and monolithic,
64 R. Potz, "Legal Problems of Muslim Minorities in vest European Countries" (1992) 7 L.
and Anth. (forthcoming).
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lent secular rather than religious certainty to society. Fundamental to
maintaining the legitimacy of this constitutional mooring of society
appeared to be a need for constitutional constancy and inflexibility.
The new angle is that, even if that view was compelling one
hundred or even only fifty years ago, the rapidity of technological and
social change is now so great that evolving constitutional systems will
have -to demonstrate much greater responsiveness, or a "permanent
learning capacity" to use Potz's words. Basic human rights have to be
protected in a fixed way but, apart from that, constitutional legitimacy in
the twenty-first century will derive from the discriminating flexibility of
each constitutional system. This is very nearly the opposite of the
current Australian system of conferring constitutional legitimacy.
Another interesting case is Spain, which, in the post-Franco era,
has also seen major constitutional change. A federal structure is 65now in
place, although it is not described as federal for historical reasons.
The interesting thing about the Spanish constitutional
experiment of the last two decades is that, although there was strong
support for the dismantling of the highly centralized, Falangist state and
the movement towards a federal system, in some regions it appears this
has not produced the anticipated benefits. Citizens still have a "beforeand-after picture" so the new structure is far from having the given
status, in some parts of Spain, that the classical federal structure has in
Australia, where it spans four generations. Thus, when regional
governments falter in Spain, people more readily consider whether the
new structure is worth the trouble. 66 If financial collapses of the sort
littering the landscapes in Victoria, South Australia, and Western
Australia had occurred within some of the new autonomous regions in
Spain, it is quite likely that their continuation as political entities would
be questioned. In Australia, these collapses have not threatened the
existence of these states. We seem to be accustomed, politically, to the
immutability of our existing structure.
Other European examples are also available. The Belgians,
especially over the last decade, have moved to a federal structure of

65 The reluctance of Spaniards to use this word derives from the tragedy of the First Federal
Republic of 1873. This Federal Republic was established following the overthrow, in 1868 of the
Bourbon Queen, Isabel II, by an alliance of reform-minded generals and admirals. The naive
political adventure of the 1873 First Federal Republic ended in disarray and in the restoration of
the Bourbon monarchy by 1874. This history has tainted the expression "federal" in Spain ever
since.
66 j. Hooper, The Spaniards(London: Penguin, 1987) at 266.
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extraordinary complexity. 6 7 Again, what is interesting is the way in
which the nation's constitutional structure has (by Australian standards)
been so readily adapted to meet the exigencies of the current era.
Specifically, the Belgians have moved in this direction as part of the
ongoing process of dealing with their two thousand-year-old
Flemish/French divide.
In Germany, the political structure in the western half of the
country has coped with the absorption of the eastern part of Germany,
which until October 1990 was a separate nation with a population the
size of Australia's. Contemplating the rapid achievement of a change of
68
such magnitude staggers the Australian constitutional imagination.
Economically, this is a task roughly parallel to the United States of
America absorbing Mexico. 69
Ultimately, these experiences point to a major change in
continental European constitutionalism. The role of European
constitutional structures in affecting and, indeed, determining many
aspects of day-to-day socio-economic life is widely recognized and
studied. The perception is now well developed that these fundamental
structures must be monitored for their effectiveness. They need to be
responsive. They need to be crafted to meet the needs of the twentyfirst century. These fundamental structures are shedding their status as
unchangeable instruments for maintaining social order. Indeed, the
authoritative inflexibility, which was historic constitutionalism's raison
d'etre, increasingly conflicts with the new demands for constitutional
responsiveness.
What might account for this apparent, relative constitutional
dynamism in Europe vis-,t-vis Australia? Clearly there are major
cultural, economic, and political differences. More critical, however,
67 For an overview of this novel, if Byzantine, experiment in federalism, see R. Cullen,
"Adaptive Federalism in Belgium" (1990) 13 U.N.S.W.LJ. 346.
68 This transition has brought with it serious difficulties in adjustment. In particular, as the
economic consequences of incorporation have been unfolding in the former East Germany, social
and political stability have been threatened, and the German "economic miracle" no longer looks
inviolable. Nevertheless, given the extraordinarily daunting nature of the task, the achievements so
far remain remarkable. We are not underestimating the difficulties of carrying through with
reunification. Currently the Germans are experiencing significant social disruption in the old East
Germany, as former state-run industries close down across the region. The better view would seem
to be that this, although forbidding, is almost certainly transitory and, indeed, was expected. To a
significant degree, the disruption appears to be a product of unrealistic expectations of the East
Germans (about the speed of their material transformation into West Germans) and of the West
Germans (about the state of the East German socio-economy).
69 Of course, in the German example, historical language and cultural factors are also major
differences.
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seems to be a widespread European recognition that they are in the
midst of a major period of change. There has been a recognition of and
response to the economic and political-historical forces driving this
period of transformation. The Australian experience appears to be very
similar. Major forces are changing the world about and within Australia.
We recognize this to varying degrees and with considerable reluctance.

We are not yet making the linkages between this appreciation and the
development of our political architecture.
IV. THE CASE FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
It must be stressed again that we do not see fundamental
constitutional change as an antidote to Australia's economic woes. We
also recognize the advances made and being made by the now
accelerating process of ad hoc constitutional adjustment.
It remains the case, however, that there is something basically
wrong with today's Australian constitutional reality. The Constitution
has been left formally intact but through High Court judgments and,
increasingly, through intergovernmental cooperation, it has been bent
almost double to make it work. In itself, this juxtaposition of form and
actuality speaks potently of the need for fundamental change. It is a
little like having a Model T Ford, which has been updated over the years
with somewhat improved brakes, steering, suspension, fuel control,
valves, etcetera. The claim that it is "just as good as ever" might convince
the irredeemably nostalgic. It should, today, convince few others who
know anything about motor cars, or constitutions.
Of course there are some who argue that it is the compromising
of the Constitution by the High Court and governments that is the cause
of our structural problems. These critics say, more or less, that we need
to revert, in substance, to something closer to the form of the
Constitution. We believe this view to be intrinsically misconceived. To
return to a structure and to practices, which were discarded because they
did not meet the challenges of years gone by, cannot be a sensible
strategy.
Other factors cogently challenging our neglect of ongoing
fundamental review have been discussed in this paper. First, there are
the pressures being applied by the globalization of so many economic
factors in the world. The critical point is that this mercantile revolution
is applying changing economic pressures so quickly and so powerfully
that swift and precise national responses are often required. Few
nations are able to provide these responses. But some are worse in this
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regard than others. Australia's responsiveness is improving but it
remains very poor by world standards. Second, there are the accessible
insights from other disciplines such as regional science and from
comparative studies.
Regional science stresses two facets of real interest. First, it
focuses on the controlling effects of our basic constitutional structure on
most operational aspects of the Australian political economy. For many
lawyers, these linkages are often not noticed or are regarded as being
too tenuous to warrant serious attention, especially during extended
periods of economic crisis such as we are experiencing now. Regional
science suggests that this is a misguided judgment. Second, it
demonstrates that our fundamental political structure is not a unique
artifact. It is simply another, very important, slow-to-change component
in Australia's total infrastructure. Understood in this way, its almost
mystical, formal inflexibility begins to look like a curiosity rather than a
compelling essence.
From the comparative discussion, it appears that these
theoretical insights are manifesting themselves to some degree in what is
now the world's pre-eminent political laboratory, continental western
Europe. Political and societal attitudes to constitutional change and to
the purpose of fundamental political structures are altering within many
western European nations. These changes are occurring both at the
national level and at the level of Euro-federalism. The momentum is
considerable and seems to be growing.
The lessons for Australia are clear. We need to activate a
process of ongoing fundamental review-a process that goes well beyond
all our past experiences of window dressing and ad hoc bursts of reform.
We have not been able to do this throughout this century. The chances
of any rapid initiation of such a process are bleak. However, the
circumstances compelling this journey are going to grow more acute. In
the longer term there will be no avoiding this task. The opportunity and
the challenge is to embrace it, to manage it creatively, and to breach the
cycle of decades of rancorous reactive change.
Let us now return to the present political world and consider the
task of working for structural fundamental change within that reality.
V. TACKLING STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN AUSTRALIA
The past twenty years have seen a stirring of interest in
constitutional reform in Australia. The Constitutional Convention,
which first met in 1974, struggled through four sessions until it was eased
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from the toils of this world in 1986. The Convention was monopolized
by serving parliamentarians. It could boast only three minor alterations
to the fagade of the political architecture, which were approved by a
referendum in 1977.70 For much of its extended life, the Convention was
distracted by the issues raised by the 1975 constitutional crisis. But the
members of the Convention, most of them participants in that crisis,
found objectivity and compromise impossible. The Convention's agenda
was dominated by partisan posturing.
In 1986, the Commonwealth government established the
Constitutional Commission, which had a compact membership 71 and was
assisted by a series of expert committees. Two years of intensive work,
including discussion papers, public hearings and submissions, and
committee reports, produced the Commission's FinalReport in late 1988.
But, before that Report was published, the Labor government cobbled
together several proposals for constitutional alteration and put these to a
referendum in September 1988. As with the proposals that had emerged
from the Constitutional Convention in 1977, these dealt with a few
friction points in the processes of government and added a few
sweeteners. 72 But they did not address any of the fundamental structural
weaknesses in Australia's federal system. The opposition, adopting the
traditional tactics of confusion and obfuscation, campaigned against the
proposals73 and the electorate rewarded this energetic campaign by
inflicting on the reform proposals the highest "no" vote seen in eightyodd years of referenda. 74
This sorry episode, with its combination of overly hasty action by
70 These were, first, a system for filling casual vacancies in the Senate, which recognized the
significance of party political affiliation; second, a retiring age (seventy years) for federal judges;
and, third, a referendum franchise for Territory residents.
71 Chaired by former Commonwealth Solicitor-General Byers, the Commission included
former Prime Minister Whitlam, former Victorian Premier Hamer, a Federal Court judge, and two

academic constitutional lawyers. The Federal Court judge, John Toohey, left the Commission when
he was appointed to the High Court in 1987.
72 The friction points hinged on the relationship between the two federal houses of
Parliament, the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the distorted electoral systems used

for some state parliaments. The sweeteners were embodied in a modest catalogue of guarantees of
individual rights: jury trial, freedom of religion, and property rights.

73 Observers with some faith in the democratic process must have been intrigued by the
opposition's claims that guaranteeing trial by jury for criminal offences, full compensation for any
government acquisition of private property, or the free exercise of religion threatened the fabric of

Australian society.
74 See E. Campbell, "Changing the Constitution-Past and Future" (1989) 17 Melbourne U.
L Rev. 1; H.P. Lee, "Reforming the Australian Constitution: The Frozen Continent Refuses to

Thaw" [1988] Pub. L. 535.
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the government, cynical opportunism by the Opposition, and confused
reaction on the part of the voters, had the effect of destroying the
Constitutional Commission's proposals before they were published.
When the proposals were released a few weeks after the September 1988
referendum, they were seen as a series of substantial but modest
suggestions for adapting the structure and function of Australia's
political architecture to the twenty-first century. Although the
Commission urged the retention of Australia's federal system and the
division of governmental powers between Commonwealth and states, it
recommended two dramatic enlargements of the Commonwealth's
legislative powers. First, it suggested that the Commonwealth be given
power over "trade and commerce," without any words of qualification; 75
and, second, that it be given power over "industrial relations."7 6 These
changes, in combination with the taxation, corporations, and external
affairs powers (which the Commission recommended be left
unchanged), would undoubtedly have rewritten the division of economic
regulatory powers within the Australian federation, and given a sharp
stimulus to the process of rationalization of regulatory standards. But
after the September 1988 referendum, the Labor government had clearly
lost its appetite for constitutional reform; the Commission's FinalReport
and recommendations were confined to library reference shelves.
However, during 1990, the Labor government restarted the
process of constitutional change. First, it began to negotiate an
exchange of legislative and fiscal powers with the states; second, it
started building the foundations for a rewriting of the Constitution,
which would coincide with the centenary of the drafting and adoption of
the current Constitution during the 1890s.
The first of these strategies was initiated at the Special Premiers'
Conference held on 30 and 31 October 1990. Chaired by the Prime
Minister and attended by the Premiers of the six states and two
territories, premiers' conferences are a regular feature of the Australian
political calendar. Their agenda has always been set and controlled by
the Commonwealth government and largely confined to the delivery, by
the Commonwealth government, of its decisions on such matters as
borrowing by all levels of government and the distribution of
Commonwealth revenues to the mendicant states and territories. But
75 That is, the power would not be limited, as it has been since 1901, to interstate and
international trade and commerce. See supra note 38 at para. 11.1.
76 This is so that the Commonwealth would no longer be obliged to administer its industrial
relations policy indirectly through an independent conciliation and arbitration agency, nor would it
be confined to the narrow field of interstate industrial disputes. Supra note 38 at para. 11.119.
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the aim of the Special Premiers' Conference of October
1990 was
77
described as the "reforming of intergovernmental relations.
The agenda of the Special Premiers' Conference was consciously
driven by economic, rather than political, considerations. Recognizing
that changes were needed to make the Australian economy more
competitive and flexible, the Conference declared that a more effective
public sector was essential to microeconomic reform! 8 The
commitments to change adopted at the Conference included a
fundamental review of Commonwealth/state financial arrangements to
redress "vertical fiscal imbalance;"' 79 a rationalization of regulatory
activities in such areas as packaging and labelling, food standards,
planning and building approvals, and occupational licensing;8 0
integration of rail transport and regulation of road transport 8 1 "the
development of a more co-operative intergovernmental environment
[sic] policy;"'8 2 and "enhanced co-operative efforts in industrial
83
relations."
The strategy endorsed by the governments in October 1990 was
essentially consensual. It stressed consultation, cooperation, and
exchange of responsibilities. And the goal was purely reformist:
"improving the workings of the Australian Federation." Political events
have since largely overtaken this initiative. Some improvements may
emerge but the broad reformist momentum has gone. 4
The second strategy was launched in April 1991 when the
Constitutional Centenary Conference was held in Sydney.85 This
Conference nominally celebrated the first of the Constitutional
Conventions, held in Sydney in 1891, which led nine years later to the
77

Special Premiers' Conference, "Communique" (31 October 1990) at 1.
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Ibid.

79 Ibid.
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lbid. at 4-5.
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Ibid. at 5-6.
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lbid. at 11.
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1bid at 12.

84 The principal reason for the loss of momentum was the deposing of Robert Hawke as
Prime Minister of Australia in late 1991 by Pai Keating, the current Prime Minister. Keating has

stressed a strong centralist approach to intergovernmental negotiations.
85 The responsibility for this initiative lies partly with the Hawke Labor Government.

Chastened by its ignominious failure in 1988, it now sees the value of moving deliberately and with
broad political support. Partly it has ties also with a small and enterprising group of academic
lawyers, including Cheryl Saunders of Melbourne University and James Crawford, formerly of

Sydney University.
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Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (U.K.). More
substantially, it provided the occasion, as the first Convention had in
1891, for a selected group of politicians, lawyers, academics, and
journalists to debate and adopt an agenda for constitutional reform to
pursue through this decade.
Among the key issues highlighted by this Conference were the
potentially divisive questions of Australia's head of state, guarantees of
basic rights, and the place of Australia's indigenous people in the
nation's political framework. These questions are entirely independent
of the federal system and its divisions of governmental responsibility.
The Conference endorsed the continuation of a federal system of
government as "highly desirable for Australia in the twenty-first
century," but it diluted that endorsement with a dash of realism. The
"internationalisation of economic activity," the Conference said,
"requires an effective Australian economic union."8 6 And the
Conference noted, "considerable support ... for an examination of the
distribution of powers between the Commonwealth and the States,"
particularly in the areas of "natural resources and environmental effects
87
... and industrial relations."
The assumptions, which underpin these two strategies, are that
significant structural change is unlikely and that any alterations to our
political architecture must be incremental and symmetrical. If the
national government is to be given authority to set national economic
and environmental policies, then the states must be offered a
corresponding transfer of national powers. The metaphor of design
appears particularly inappropriate for this process, which is redolent
more of the marketplace. Perhaps this is the way forward in the 1990s.
Certainly it is a consideration, which recognizes the huge political
difficulties that have confronted constitutional reform programmes in
the past, which acknowledges that no change is likely to be achieved
without broad, bipartisan support, and which concedes that this support
must be bought. The price to be paid in a society whose political culture
is essentially materialistic and shallow, is calculated in two currencies:
revenue and power. So it is reported, for example, that the
Commonwealth government is about to exchange its innovative

86 Constitutional Centenary Conference, Concluding Statement: A ConstitutionalReview
Process at para. S.
87

1bid. at para. 10.
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residential welfare programmes for the states' industrial relations
powers.88
VI. CONCLUSION
Australia is facing substantial and serious economic problems.
The Constitution has contributed both directly and indirectly to a
significant degree to creating this mess. The reality for the foreseeable
future is that we will have to live with the current classical federal
structure. We do seem, however, to be moving towards a gradual
recognition of the reality that we have an outdated Constitution within
which flourishes a shallow and abrasive political culture. We have long
pretended that we have sophisticated political institutions and something
approaching a model political structure. That pretence still provides
comfort to some, but for many, it no longer compels support.
The realities of entrenched political institutions must affect the
development of any strategy for change in Australia's political
architecture. The goals of that strategy need, however, to be informed
by more than merely an assessment of what is "achievable."
We need to approach the task of constitutional renovation with a
much more open mind less confined by the "political realities." We see
the process of major renovation to the Australian Constitution spanning
up to two decades. That process should not try to establish a blueprint
for the next fifty or one hundred years. The nature of the world today is
that it is an exciting, challenging, and still dangerous place. A thoughtful
and considered adaptability is the key to coping with the challenges and
the dangers. The days of the overarching, rigid constitution set in stone
seem to be passing. Some fundamental aspects of our lives need to be
protected against regular change, such as basic human rights. But this
type of fundamental protection is not needed in a wide range of other
areas where we remain extremely rigid, for example, in the regulation of
the economy and the management of our welfare state.
In a process of major renovation it is crucial that we canvass as
widely as possible throughout the world for useful comparative material.
The comparative exercise should not constrain our imaginations and
creativity. It is not a matter of copying another political system. Rather,
we should learn from the experience of others. This means going
beyond constitutional experience in the Anglo-centred world. We need
to abandon parochialism about the development of our political
88

TheAge (13 April 1991).
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structure. It is unthinkable that we would change our tax laws without
intense comparative study or build a motor car today based simply on
Australian experience. We look for guidance and help throughout the
world in such enterprises. We should be doing the same in the process
of constitutional renovation.
Another crucial factor will be the input of a much wider crosssection of groups than participated in the development of our current
political structure one hundred years ago. In particular, one thinks of
women, native peoples, and various minorities. This is going to produce
difficulties, but it is crucial that any renovated structure have
commitment from across the national spectrum.
So what might a renovated Australian political structure look
like?89 We do not know the precise answers to this question. What we
do know is that Australians ought to search for the answer more
systematically and more thoroughly than they have so far. In doing so
Australians will have to address concerns such as introducing different
types of checks and balances on government to those which operate
under our current structure. The checks and balances of the current
classical federal system are not very effective and are linked to major
dislocations and the poor performance of the Australian socio-economy.
It may be that we will continue with a federal structure but one
less complex and more truly decentralized in a number of areas than the
existing structure. That is, possibly one with only two levels of
government.
We will certainly need to address which matters could be more
decentralized than they are now and which should be more nationally
controlled. One can think of significant benefits, which may arise from
decentralizing the management of our educational system, our police
forces, and aspects of our telecommunications system. On the other
hand, the realities of the global economy and our experience suggest
that effective, standardized, if not centralized, regulation of the
economy, including the welfare system, may be crucial for success in the
twenty-first century.
Finally, this project must recognize the huge difficulty of moving
from argued proposals to the implementation of changes, which will
have widespread effects on all Australians. First, the process must elicit
commitment from those affected. This is a very long-term process. In
Australia, it requires the gradual engendering of a positive recognition, a

89 Clearly the problem of setting national goals, referred to in the Introduction arises once
more.
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trust, that we can manage such change. 90 Second, we may want to test
proposed changes by using pilot projects.
In summary, we see the process of major renovation as: (1)
tackling the task with a clean slate; (2) encompassing the full spectrum
of groups in the nation; (3) applying a rigorous comparative perspective;
(4) not aiming for any sort of new, rigid blueprint but recognizing the
principle of contingency that is going to apply to many aspects of
constitutionalism in the future; (5) canvassing all practical options for
managing change effectively; and (6) commencing while we continue
with the current process of constitutional adjustment. It must be
stressed again that fundamental constitutional change is not an antidote
to Australia's economic woes. The advances made and being made by
the now accelerating process of ad hoc constitutional adjustment also
must not be undervalued.
The hidden agenda here is not to overthrow federalism in
Australia. Our argument is, simply, that we must rescind our
preoccupation with reactive, inward-looking change and open ourselves
to more adventurous restructuring opportunities. This process may lead
to the retention of a federal structure, but one developed for the twentyfirst century. The programme of research and development will take
time to bear fruit. We have to be patient. We must also commence this
programme. The components in the process of major constitutional
research should include wide participation; realistic goals, which
recognize the contingent nature of any proposed changes; regular
comparative analysis; sensitive implementation mechanisms; and an
open mind on what is possible. The task is not simply to mend the faults.
It is also positive. It is to design for a worthy future.

90 We have, incidentally, already done so. The Brisbane City Council, with its powerful single
authority status, is generally reckoned to have demonstrated its operating superiority as a local
government entity (vis-a-vis the multi-council systems, which prevail in Melbourne and Sydney, for
example).

